The path of a packet
A packet for a protected service meets four stages, each cheaper than the next would be.
- XDP, in the network driver. Before the kernel allocates anything, an eBPF program checks the packet: malformed headers, fragments that reassembly would reject, IPv6 header chains past their limit, traffic to ports nothing listens on, and addresses on the ban list are dropped here. Per-source rate limits for SYN, UDP and ICMP use per-CPU maps, so a random-source flood does not serialise the cores.
- The SYN challenge. XDP answers each new TCP connection with a SYN-ACK carrying our own cookie: a keyed hash of the connection, the client's sequence number and the minute. A TC program checks the client's answer and hands the connection to the listening socket. Spoofed floods get an answer nobody reads; the listener only ever sees completed handshakes. The cookie carries window scaling and SACK, so clients without TCP timestamps keep their speed.
- The proxy. HAProxy, patched and built by us, terminates TLS and forwards to your origins over kept-alive connections, with health checks, retries to another origin and reloads that keep every connection.
- The guard. Our agent reads every request event and scores each client address: request floods, error storms, 404 scanners, user-agent switching, credential stuffing, MAC cracking and account sharing. Past the threshold the address is banned in the proxy and in XDP.
What the node keeps doing on its own
Configuration arrives signed from our control plane. If the control plane is unreachable, the node keeps its last confirmed firewall and configuration, across restarts and reboots. Firewall changes are applied provisionally and roll back on their own if the node cannot reach us afterwards, so a bad rule cannot lock a server out.
Lab results
Measured on our own servers joined by a private VLAN, with the method written up for each run. Floods come from dedicated generators; legitimate clients run alongside and count every failed request.